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The Efficiency of Producing Alcohol for Energy
in Brazil: Comment

In a 1982 issue of this journal, Michael Barzelay and Scott R. Pearson
examined the social costs and benefits of producing ethanol motor fuel
in Brazil.' They conclude that ethanol fuel was economically infeasible
in 1981 and will remain so unless petroleum prices rise dramatically in
the future. We seek first to call attention to some problems in their data
and second to suggest that their analysis include broader considerations. Quite different conclusions could result.
Ethanol Costs of Production Data
Barzelay and Pearson base their analysis on the published production
costs of COPERSUCAR, the prominent and respected sugar mill
cooperative in Sao Paulo and Parani.2 Without question, COPERSUCAR has the most complete data-reporting network on sugar costs
in Brazil. But what should be questioned is whether its data are appropriate for Barzelay and Pearson's purposes. Two points are noteworthy:
First, COPERSUCAR, in addition to being a first-class agricultural research institute, represents the political interests of its sugar
mill owners. A key lobbying effort arises before each harvest when the
federal government sets official prices for sugarcane, sugar, and
ethanol. Clearly, it is in the interests of the cooperative to promote high
prices for its outputs of sugar and ethanol, and it thus annually publishes its expected costs well in advance of the pricing decision. Barzelay and Pearson correctly note this fact and reduce COPERSUCAR's reported costs by 20% "to compensate for the suspected
overestimation of the published data" (p. 135). It is unclear how the
authors arrive at the 20% figure, and the issue of ethanol efficiency
appears rather sensitive to this parameter (see n. 9 below).3
Second, the cooperative's membership, and hence its survey, is
made up almost exclusively of sugar mills and their annexed distil? 1985 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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TABLE 1
NATIONAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM: PROJECTS APPROVED BY CENAL,

1975-81

TYPE OF DISTILLERY

Annexed

Autonomous

N

Additional Capacity
(millions of
liters/year)

63
144
207

1,710.8
3,135.0
4,845.8

REGION

N

Additional Capacity
(millions of
liters/year)

North-Northeast
Central-South
Total

61
122
183

884.9
2,374.6
3,259.5

SOURCE.-CENAL (May 1981).

leries.4 The alcohol being produced is largely anhydrous ethanol,
which is 99.6% water-free and suitable for mixing with gasoline in
conventional motors. As table 1 shows, however, over 50% of the
ethanol projects approved by the Executive National Alcohol Commission (CENAL) during 1975-81 were autonomous distilleries largely
producing hydrated ethanol.5 Hydrated ethanol contains up to 6% water and may be burned directly in motors designed for its use. It is
cheaper to produce than anhydrous because it provides more volume
and does not require an expensive benzine "stripping" to remove the
final percentages of water. COPERSUCAR itself estimates that in annexed distilleries hydrated ethanol is 4.5% cheaper to produce than
anhydrous.6 For this reason and others, Barzelay and Pearson's analysis of social profitability for 1980-81 needs refining.
Social Profitability, 1980-81
Using their data, I recalculated social profitability in 1980-81, accounting for differences between anhydrous and hydrated ethanol. Their
"base case" cost of US$0.24 per liter of ethanol is assumed to refer to
anhydrous ethanol because their original cost estimates were for this
fuel, and the text mentions adjustments in this cost relating only to
higher petroleum prices.7 One may calculate conservatively that the
cost of hydrated ethanol is therefore $0.23 per liter (4.5% below anhydrous costs).
As the authors correctly note, anhydrous ethanol may replace
gasoline on a one-for-one basis when mixed with gasoline (up to 30%).
Hydrated ethanol, on the other hand, does not substitute one-for-one
when burned directly, because 20% more is necessary to provide the
same mileage as gasoline. At a 1981 world price of petroleum at $34 per
barrel, the per-liter price of gasoline is $0.24 in real terms. Thus the
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TABLE 2
SOCIAL COSTS AND RETURNS,

1980-81

TYPE OF ETHANOL

Costs
Returns
Net losses
NoTE.-Figures

Anhydrous

Hydrated

.24
.24
.00

.23
.20
.03

in US$ per liter.

social value of anhydrous ethanol (substituted volume for volume for
gasoline) is $0.24. The social value of hydrated ethanol (substituted at a
rate of 1.2 to 1.0) is $0.20.8
The recalculated social costs and returns in 1980-81 are quite
different from those reported by Barzelay and Pearson (see table 2).
The anhydrous ethanol production was indeed viable in 1980-81, and
the net social loss in hydrated ethanol was almost one-half that reported in the original article.9
The conclusion that hydrated ethanol is not economical is borne
out by other research. 1 However, though Barzelay and Pearson note
some of the beneficial externalities arising from hydrated ethanol production, they are arguably not the most important.
Externalities
Proilcool is the Brazilian National Alcohol Program. Although many of
its social objectives have not been realized," key strategic and economic goals are closer to fulfillment as a result of ethanol production.
National Energy Security
Brazil imported about 80% of the petroleum it needed in 1980, and 79%
of these imports came from the Middle East. 12 The first strategic benefits of ethanol were realized sooner than expected when war broke out
between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. Virtually overnight, 40% of
petroleum imports were cut off. A difficult period ensued, but by raising the proportion of alcohol in gasoline to 30%, instituting conservation measures, and making spot purchases df petroleum, a major economic and political crisis was averted. This year ethanol is expected to
substitute 37%for gasoline, accordingto official projections.13
Emphasizing production of export crops such as sugar or soybeans-instead of ethanol-to earn foreign exchange would have had
disastrous results for Brazil because of the world recession and overproduction.14 Thus ethanol continues to provide a cushion of domestic
liquid fuel, which contributes to national energy security.15
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Promotion of Consumer and Capital Goods
Industries and Exports

Proilcool was instrumentalin maintainingautomotivesales at approximately one million units per year during 1975-80, accordingto planning ministerDelfim Neto.16 Consumeracceptance of all-ethanolcars
has increased dramaticallywith the eliminationof startingand corrosion problemsfound in earliermodels. Demandhas also dependedon
financial considerations (lower taxes on ethanol fuel and improved
engine efficiency)as well as on considerationsof futuregasolineversus
ethanolsupplies. Whereastotal automobilesales fell to 700,000units in
1982, ethanol cars in mid-1983accounted for 80%of total sales.17
Proilcool has also stimulatedcapitalgoods production.Withfew
exceptions, the 300 distilleryprojectsbuilt or in progressutilize grinding mills, distillationcolumns, pumps,tanks, cranes,furnaces,conveyors, generators,and other equipmentmanufacturedin Brazil. The expertise gained in ethanol capital goods productionand the chemical
process has enabledBrazilto become an exporterof such equipmentto
developingcountries, includingIndonesia,the Philippines,Costa Rica,
and Paraguay.18
Althougha breakdownof distilleryequipmentexports alone was
not available, total Brazilianexports of furnaces, mechanicalinstruments, and machinesgrew 25%from 1979to 1982. Exportearningsin
1982amountedto US$1.2 billion.'9
Conclusion
A recalculationof ethanol costs and benefitsand the inclusionof beneficial externalitiesfavorably alters the conclusions to be drawn about
Proilcool in 1981. More recently, petroleum prices have fallen; so
presumablyhave the real costs of producingethanol (measuredby the
opportunitycost of resources that would otherwise be idle because of
the world sugarglut). Proilcool is providingstable and increasedrural
employmentat a time when sugarprospectsare bleakfor the shortand
long term (see n. 14). Even a net loss in hydratedethanol production,
as noted above, mustbe consideredin the lightof nationalstrategicand
economic interests.
Certainly any alternative energy programis risky: the potential
payoff depends on events or situationsthat are largely unforeseeable
and uncontrollable(e.g., stability within OPEC and the Middle East
over the next 5 years). Under these circumstances,ethanol acts beneficially as a small insurancepolicy for promotingcontinuedindustrial
and ruraldevelopment. That there may be a price to pay for this "insurance" does not necessarily invalidatethe program.20
JONATHAN
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Notes
1. MichaelBarzelayand Scott R. Pearson, "The Efficiencyof Producing
Alcohol for Energy in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change

31 (October 1982): 131-44. All subsequent references to this article will be
parentheticalin text.
2. The proper name is CooperativaCentraldos Produtoresde Agucare
Alcool do Estado de Sao Paulo.
3. According to Barzelay and Pearson, COPERSUCARofficials claim
that their data reflect the costs of mills that are "only somewhatless efficient
than average" (p. 135), but they offer no substantivedetails.
4. Interviewwith COPERSUCARofficials, May 1981.
5. The originalprojectgoals calledfor the productionof 10.7billionliters
of ethanolby 1985:6.1 billion liters hydrated,3.1 billionliters anhydrous,and
1.5 billion liters as chemicalfeedstock.
6. Julio Maria MartinsBorges (of COPERSUCAR),"Desenvolvimento
econ6mico, politica, energ~tica e Alcool," Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels Technology, Guaruji, Brazil, October

1980, p. 759. The 4.5% estimate may understatethe true cost differences,
because it appears to account only for volume and not for productioncost
differences. In addition,autonomousdistilleriesalso producea by-productof
potential value: about one-half the dried sugarcanestalks (bagasse) will be
surplusand may be burnedfor ruralelectrification,or the fiberwill be used in
papermanufacture.Annexeddistilleriesgenerallyrunout of bagasse and must
supplementwith moreexpensive fuels such as wood and coal. In theirdefense,
Barzelayand Pearsonmightarguethat annexeddistilleriesbenefitfrom economies of scale and scope in joint productionwith sugar. These advantagesdo
not accrue to autonomousdistilleriesand may counterbalancethe cost differences between anhydrousand hydratedfuel.
7. This "base case" cost includes a shadow exchange rate.
8. Thereare severalapparentinconsistenciesin the originalarticleregarding social profitabilityin 1980-81. First, the numbersin the text for ethanol
value do not matchup with the numbersin the correspondingtable 5 (pp. 14243). Second, when calculatingthe hydratedethanolvalue, the authorsmultiply
the gasoline price by 0.80. The correctparameteris 0.83, because 1.0 liters of
gasoline yields the same mileage as 1.2 liters of hydratedethanol. Thus, 1.0
liter hydratedethanol = 0.83 liters gasoline.
9. This loss would be furtherreduced to $0.01 per liter, assuming, e.g.,
that the overestimationin cost data was 25%ratherthan 20%.The "reported
COPERSUCAR cost" of anhydrous ethanol is $0.30. Because hydrated
ethanol costs 4.5% less, hydratedethanol's reportedcost is slightly less than
$0.29. If these costs are overvaluedby 25%ratherthan 20%,the base cost of
ethanol would be $0.21 per liter: (.30) (.955) (.75) = .21.
10. See Borges; Alan Poole, "A WorkingPaperon Ethanoland Methanol
as Alternatives for Petroleum Substitutionin Brazil," mimeographed(Sao
Paulo: Institute of Physics, 1979);JonathanB. Wight, "Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Ethanol Fuel Production:The Experience in Brazil"
(Ph.D. diss., VanderbiltUniversity, 1982).
11. The alcohol programhad ambitioussocial objectives for ruralareas,
such as more balancedinterregionalgrowth, improvedopportunitiesfor small
farmers,and the creationof ruralindustrialemploymentto reducemigrationto
cities. Proilcool will create about 30,000jobs in distilleriesand 270,000jobs in
agriculture,according to Borges. Still, Barzelay and Pearson correctly note
that "most of the incrementalalcohol productionhas taken place on large
complexes in the relativelywealthycentral-south"(p.
plantation-mill-distillery
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132)and muchof this new alcohol productionhas displacedfood crops, esp. in
Sao Paulo. (For further discussion, see Eli Roberto Pelin, "The Impact of
Brazil'sProilcool on LandPricesand CropSubstitutions,"Proceedingsof the
Fourth International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels Technology, GuarujB,
Brazil, October 1980, pp. 831-38.)
12. Ministryof Energyand Mines, Balango energitico nacional, 1983,p.
10; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington,D.C.: IMF,
1984),pp. 100-102.
13. "BrazilianEnergy Model," Ministryof Energyand Mines, Version2
(May 1981).
14. Worldsugarprices fell from $276/tonto $136/tonduring1982,largely
as a consequence of European sugar beet subsidies, competitionfrom corn
sweeteners, and the world recession. Brazil's sugar export earnings consequentlyfell 51%,while those for soybeans fell 34%.Coffee earnings,by contrast, rose 15%because of the coffee cartel. Figures are from Conjuntura
econ6mica 37 (February1983):162.
15. Ethanolis by no meansa panaceafor the energyproblem,as Barzelay
andPearsonnote when discussingthe diesel fuel bottleneck.In addition,Proilcool may exacerbate problemsin land distribution,food production,and byproductpollution.
16. Quotedin "Delfim:Proilcool 6 fator inflationirio,"O Estado de Sdo
Paulo (November 27, 1980).
17. "One MillionAlcohol Cars," BrazilEnergy4 (May 25, 1983):5.
18. AlthoughFrance, the United States, and Germanyare the technological leaders in ethanol productionmethods, the Braziliansprovideproven and
simple technology to countrieswith little skilled labor.
19. "Os novos horizontes da
ed. (May
exportaqao," Exame, special
1983),pp. 51-54, esp. 52.
20. One could argue, as the WorldBank does, that this "insurancepremium" be paid by a tax on importedpetroleum.

